




SCIENCE and RELIGION

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BY

PROFESSOR E. W. MACBRIDE

I esteem it a great honor to be invited to address you on one of the most momentous questions which can engage the attention of thinking men, i.e., the question how far religious belief of the Christian kind or, indeed, of any kind, is compatible with the present state of human knowledge—that is, with science. Just in proportion as I consider the question important do I think it necessary to define what is meant by religious belief, and what exactly is the task which I attempt to accomplish in regard to it.

By religious belief I mean the belief that the Power behind the universe is a moral power working for the good of every self-conscious being in it, and, further, that for every member of the human race there lies beyond death an eternal life which shall perfect the incompleteness of the present one.

These definitions, especially the latter, may seem to many people illegitimate contractions of the meaning of the word religion; but I contend that they do define the minimum of religion which the present generation of mankind will ever take seriously; and as a practical man I think it a mere waste of time to consider the claims of anything less. In past times—and times not so very long past either—it may have been possible to many to believe in and worship a God who had singled them out as they supposed for special favorable treatment, and who was credited with having the firm purpose of destroying the rest of mankind. Such a conception of God has, however, ceased to have any hold on thinking men, and so we shall have to pass it by. Again, I have heard it contended that by eternal life is meant a high and

noble kind of life, not life of an enduring character, and it is fairly probable that the religious ideas of many Jews were entirely bound up with the welfare of their nation, and that they had no hopes beyond the grave. But the Jewish religion failed, and Christianity, the leading feature of which was that it brought life and immortality to light, succeeded to it. However it may have been possible for a man like Huxley, who died at a ripe old age, having seen the successful accomplishment of most of his projects, to say that he considered the present life well worth living, even if there was no future life, yet when we consider the number of lives prematurely cut short, with powers half or not at all developed, the number of hearts broken, of hopes blighted, we shall be driven to agree with Professor McTaggart, of Cambridge, when he says "that the absence of immortality would make life a ghastly farce."

Now, it would be the very worst kind of presumption were I to attempt in half an hour to demonstrate to you two such tremendous propositions as the goodness of God and the immortality of man. I may say at once that I do not think that any demonstration can be found which is incapable of being questioned. All I can do is this: I can confess to you that I myself, having been brought up in the strict religious ideas of Puritanism, and having clung to them for a long time after I had commenced the study of science, found my traditional faith crumble to dust before the difficulties raised by the new knowledge, and that after a long period of unrest it has been possible for me to fight my way back to a hope that God and immortality are what Christ represented them to be. I can give you an outline of the reasons which seemed to me to point to this conclusion; and it may be that they may help some of you to similar conclusions. After all, however, as Balfour has said, "nothing waxes so quickly old as apologetic except criticism"—in the long run every man—at least every thinking man—has to construct his own apologetic. It may, however, be that I may start trains of thought which may lead some of you to develop a much more satisfactory apologetic than my own.

Before, however, we try to develop any apologetic, let us endeavor to look our difficulties fairly in the face. Have we any reason to believe in the existence of God at all? Has not a German philosopher said: "God did not create man, but man

created God and all the baleful consequences that flow therefrom"? Even if God exists, must we not with John Stuart Mill believe that He is limited either in His power (or if that is a contradiction), in His pity? Does not "nature, red in tooth and claw with ravine, shriek against our creed" of an All-Merciful? Again, if the doctrine of evolution be true, what right have we to believe in the existence, still less in the immortality of our souls? Are we not descended through innumerable generations from organisms as simple as Amoeba, to which it is absurd to attribute souls? If we endeavor to escape from the dilemma by asserting that all animals have souls, we are faced with the difficulty that many of the lower animals are capable of division into a number of parts, which can lead independent existences, and it will be somewhat difficult for anyone to maintain that a soul is capable of mechanical division into two other souls. Finally, does not physiology teach us that all manifestations of soul-life are caused by changes in brain substance, which are chemical and physical in their nature; indeed, that all the phenomena of life are caused by chemical changes in somewhat complicated compounds of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, iron, phosphorus, and sulphur, called proteids?

A German has summed up the conclusion of modern science in the epigram, "Ohne Phosphor kein Gedanke—auch das Bewusstsein ist eine Eigenschaft des Stoffes." "Without phosphorus there is no thought—consciousness is only a quality of matter." Here we have materialism in a nutshell.

I think the short summary which I have just given fairly represents the main questions which render the retention of religious belief difficult to many. In attempting to suggest answers to them we shall commence with the easiest, and that is the existence of God. His existence, indeed, is questioned by no thoroughly educated scientific man. Many of them object to the word, because of its association with religious faiths which they have abandoned, but the idea underlying the word is accepted by all. I may say, at this juncture, that the idea is the important thing; nothing is more pitiable than that sober discussions about the most important questions should degenerate into quibbles about the terms employed. So that when Herbert Spencer speaks of the Power whose nature must forever remain unknown to us; when Max Muller talks of the "Nous" that shines on us

through the transparent veil of nature; we must realize that both mean the same thing, namely, the Power behind nature. The reasons for the belief in the existence of such a power are as foolish as the reasons for the belief in the existence of such a power are as foolish. For this reason they are called phenomena, i.e., "appearances," for the human mind is so constituted that it inevitably seeks the explanation of everything that changes in something that does not change. Thus, so long as the atoms were regarded as ultimates, scientists sought the explanation of everything in the qualities of these atoms, which were (ex hypothesi) changeless. Now, that atoms are believed to be composite they base everything on the qualities of their supposed unchangeable components, that is, electrons. Now, the first great question that arises is this: "Are these things which are the causes of phenomena one or many?" Our savage forefathers believed that they were many, but the whole result of scientific thought may be summed up in the conviction that behind nature is one reality—one Noumenon behind all phenomena. It is impossible to believe in the independent existence from all eternity of millions of atoms or electrons exactly alike and endowed with forces of exactly the same kind uniting them into a system. The very fact that they form a system shows how absurd it is to regard them as independent ultimates, and so far as I know no leading scientist at the present day does so; the atoms are regarded by all as manifestations of the One.

When we have convinced ourselves that there is one mighty Power behind nature, we have not advanced very far. The insistent question instantly arises, "Of what nature is this Power? Doth the Almighty know and is there knowledge with the Most High? Does He consider man?" Now, to this the answer is that whatever the Power be, it must be greater than Man. The stream cannot rise higher than the fountain. The question of a personal God stands or falls with the existence of a soul in Man, and to this the most difficult and at the same time the most fundamental of all questions we must now direct our attention. Here, again, let us avoid quibbles. By soul we mean something real, which from its very nature must be permanent, something the essence of which remains the same amidst the change of surroundings. To admit the existence of such a soul

is to assert immortality; to deny life after death is in the last resort to deny the existence of the soul, as anything apart from matter. Now, on this question I confess that light came to me through the study of philosophy; and as there is a great prejudice in the minds of many people trained in science against philosophy, I must endeavor to remove it. Philosophy has seemed to many to be the art of saying few things in many words—it has even been caricatured as groping in a perfectly dark room for a perfectly black hat which is not there. But the questions which philosophy seeks to solve are questions which no scientific man can evade, however much it may be convenient to ignore them. The alternative is to base our system on the crude, unanalyzed and uncriticized preconceptions of common sense, a procedure from which the scientist would shrink with horror if applied to the special questions in which he is interested. It would lead in astronomy, for instance, to the axiom that the sun moved across the sky every day. The reason why philosophical questions are avoided is interesting; it has nothing to do with their validity; it is simply because they are questions of a metaphysic, in the Aristotelian sense—that is questions which arise after (meta) the study of physics. If a biologist like myself desired to be master in the fields of chemistry and physics, the shortness of life and the limited capacity of the human mind would render the attempt futile. If I am to know anything thoroughly I must specialize—but the subject matter of biology is not marked off by a rigid boundary from that of other sciences. Animals and plants live in a world governed by the laws of chemistry. As I cannot be an authority on these laws, I must take them ready-made from the chemist; I must accept as postulates, conclusions which are the outcome of years of investigation in chemistry. But just as the biologist stands on the back of the chemist, so the chemist stands on the back of the physicist, who supplies him with the fundamental properties of matter, and with the laws of motion. Therefore, we approach the physicist with our metaphysical questions. "What are matter, space, and time?" Not one of these can be defined except in relation to a fourth fundamental, namely, *I myself* the subject. Matter is the supposed cause of *my* sensations. Space and time, as Kant showed, can only refer to *my* experience. If thought of as existing apart from *me*, they involve contradictions, therefore, in explaining the

universe, or what is the same thing, in analysing my experience, I find that *I myself* am an ultimate which cannot be resolved into anything else; the other ultimates can only be defined in terms of *me*. An ultimate, however, which is not permanent is a contradiction in terms; ultimates are always the unchanging noumena beneath changing phenomena. When it is shown that a supposed ultimate can change, it ceases to be one and we seek beneath it for the real ultimate.

The world of experience, in fact, is a world which is presented to the subject, and if *I* have no real existence how can *my* experience be real? The denial of the reality of the self or soul involves the denial of the reality of everything else. As a bit of personal experience, perhaps, I may be pardoned for saying that when I first read Kant's destructive analysis of the ideas of space and time I felt as if I had been let out of prison. As, therefore, the reality of the ego is the basal stone in all the arguments which I shall put before you, let us look at it a little closer. The alternative to affirming the existence of a soul is to assert that what we call soul is the result of the clash of atoms. But how can the clash of atoms be conscious of itself or anything else? How can the relative position of dead particles involve knowledge of anything? And yet, in the last analysis, that is all that chemical change and chemical property, etc., can mean. Can we wonder that Huxley explicitly denied that he was a materialist, and said that he was utterly unable to conceive of matter apart from mind to picture it in? Clifford, the most thoroughgoing materialist of modern times, endeavored to escape from the dilemma by asserting that every particle of matter carried about a particle of mind-stuff. But this is a quibble—his mind-stuff is utterly incapable of definition; the only mind we know anything of is the mind of man, and that is a unit which by its very nature is indivisible. If Clifford means that each atom has a mind like that of man, that is equivalent to saying that each atom has a soul, and if he does not mean this, his mind stuff is an empty phrase.

At once, however, a host of questions rises in our minds. "How can you assert," you will say to me, "that there is a permanent soul in man, when he was evolved from the beast?" "Where was the soul before birth, and if it had a beginning must it not also have an end?" and so on. I do not pretend for a

moment that I can give a satisfactory answer to these questions. I frankly take up the position of agnosticism with regard to them, and say at once I do not know, but I wish to point out that the belief in the existence of a soul and the belief in evolution, nay, even in the belief of our own birth, rests upon very different kinds of evidence. The belief in the existence of a soul is a postulate of all knowledge, as in Euclid's postulate, that two straight lines cannot enclose a space in geometry; unless this be admitted no geometrical proposition can be proved. So, unless the reality of the soul is assumed nothing can be known—knowing, in fact, has no meaning, for, in what sense could dead atoms be said to “know” each other? But when I take my little boy on my knee and tell him that something happened before he was born, and he turns to me and asks with wondering eyes, “Where was I then?”, I feel at once that one's beginning in time is no self-evident proposition. The belief in one's birth is an inference from what people around us tell us—the belief, that is to say, in the existence of a stretch of time to which our consciousness has no relation. It is not a matter of consciousness, but is really merely a reasonable, well-grounded hypothesis. So, too, the doctrine of evolution is a reasonable deduction from fossils and from the resemblance between the bodies of other animals and our own bodies. Nay, more, the existence of other men and women, in the sense of the belief that they have souls like our own is not self-evident, it is a splendidly grounded hypothesis; but the fact that it is an hypothesis is shown by the action of our forefathers in endowing trees, fountains, waves, and wind with souls—a position which no one would now maintain. Now, the evidence on which the hypotheses rest, which appears to contradict the immortality of the soul, is not to be compared for certainty with that on which the belief in immortality rests. The latter, when carefully scrutinized, is the implied pre-supposition of all knowledge. The former consists of deductions from details of that knowledge. Let us, therefore, avoid letting what we know be shaken by what we do not know. Many attempts at reconciling these difficulties have been made, but I forbear entering into them now lest you should confuse the solid basis on which the belief in the reality of the subject or soul is founded with the hazy, unsatisfactory nature of these hypotheses. I prefer to recognize truth on both sides of the contradiction and to

believe that when faith is replaced by sight the contradiction will vanish.

I do not flatter myself that I have removed all difficulties from your minds on this most fundamental of all subjects. I do honestly think, however, that careful thought and study will lead you to my position in this matter. Such a jewel as a well-grounded belief in immortality is not to be won without hard work.

Supposing, for the present, that you have reached the position which I have outlined, let us return to the great question: "Does the Power behind the universe care for man?" Now, if we have souls, God must have the essential qualities of our souls. He, of course, has infinitely more—He is superhuman, but let us observe that this means at least human. Herbert Spencer and others of his school have talked of the absurdity of fastening on the Supreme the limitations of personality, as if consciousness, will, and emotion were limitations, and as if by divesting the Supreme Power of these we are enlarging our conceptions of it. In this respect that fascinating philosopher, Hegel, has done us great service. I am far from supposing that he has proved that wonderful dialectical ascent of his from the category of *pure being* to the category of *absolute spirit*—the Hegelian God, in whom we live and move and have our being—but on many points the correctness of his arguments is generally admitted.

Now, one of Hegel's most valuable points is that the source of all error and contradiction is abstraction; that is, considering things as if they existed independently of one another, whereas, they all exist together in one universe. Thus, a physicist considering only physics is certainly abstracting, and so is a biologist considering only biology. Owing, as I said before, to limitations of time, we are forced to abstract, but Hegel presses on us that in virtue of that fact we can only reach partial truth. Now, all philosophers—those who oppose, and those who agree with Hegel—know that we are never directly conscious of *things*. We have a confused mass of sensations pouring in on us and our mind reduces these to order by applying to them certain fundamental conceptions called *categories*. Such are, for instances, *being*, *time*, *space*, *substance*, *cause*, and, Hegel would add, *personality*. Hegel asserts that each of the lower categories taken by itself is absurd. Kant had already shown this for *space* and *time*, whilst

Hegel shows it for *being*, *substance*, and *cause*. He asserts that they are really abstractions of the higher idea of *personality*.

Now, this idea of Hegel's is confirmed by the actual history of these conceptions in human thought, for they originated as evaporations and emasculations of the idea of *personality*. The idea that in a thing there is a *substance* which would be unaltered were all the qualities to change is just the pale reflection of our immediate knowledge of the unity and persistence of our own souls—it is a kind of soul which we impute to things. In early human history a soul like that of man was supposed to reside in all surrounding objects; in this period of *animism*, as it is called, the category of *personality* was used to interpret practically all phenomena. Similarly, the idea of *cause* is derived from our consciousness of our own will-power and, therefore, in denying consciousness and emotion to God we are abstracting from the idea of personality and so limiting Him, and the moment this is clearly seen the absurdity of the proceeding will be manifest.

God must, therefore, have consciousness, will, and feeling, but is His will good or is it cruel? Why does Nature out of fifty seeds only bring but one to bear? Why is there pain and woe and misery in the world? The older theologian would have answered, "Because of sin." Now, I frankly admit that this explanation is utterly unsatisfactory to me. I will go further, and say that the continued official reception of such dogmas is the cause of the alienation of the younger generation from our churches. The old dogmas of Calvinism, which are not peculiar to the Presbyterian Church, but in some form or other have been accepted by every branch of Christianity, can be traced back to Paul, the Rabbinical Jew.*

*As instances of these doctrines may be mentioned: (a) the doctrine that all mankind are descended from a single pair, with whom God made a bargain (covenant), and upon their default, not only they themselves, but all their unborn children, were placed under God's condemnation; (b) the doctrine of the elect nation; this the outcome of Israel's pride in a supposed special relation to the Almighty Maker of heaven and earth was allegorized by Paul to apply to that portion of mankind who would eventually yield to Christianity, all the rest being devoted to utter destruction, exactly as all nations other than the Jewish were by the Rabbis supposed to have as their future fate utter destruction by the Almighty; (c) the doctrine of a "law of God" in the forensic sense, of which God was the administrator, every infraction of which demanded a formal penalty from the transgressor or his substitute. Curious examples of Rabbinical prototypes of these ideas are given in Edersheim's "Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah."

The simple fact that suffering existed millions of years before man was on the earth disposes of this explanation. Of course, it is right to point out with Alfred Russell Wallace that the amount of suffering in the lower creation has been grossly exaggerated; that there is grave reason for doubting whether in a large part of it there is consciousness at all, and that in that part to which we may attribute consciousness, pain is nothing like what it appears to be to our minds. The fact that savages, except when pressed by hunger, are in general extremely jolly animals, may be borne in mind in this connection. But how can any pain be reconciled with the belief in an all-merciful God? And why should advance in civilization render the consciousness of pain keener? It is useless to quote Paul and tell us that in Adam all fell, and that every one of us is a child of wrath from his birth. Adam is a highly mythical personage, never once alluded to by the Founder of Christianity, and if he did exist and did sin, we are not responsible for it. For everything that surrounds us at our birth, God, and God alone, is responsible. Our parents, our country, everything else as far as we are concerned, are only His agents.

"He placed thee in this dance
Of plastic circumstance,
This present thou wouldst fain arrest,"

says Browning, deepest and noblest of our poets. So as to this so-called evil nature, which is simply the lower animal nature which still clings to us, we are not responsible for having it, any more than is the tadpole for the useless tail he still carries when he comes on land. But in our own minds we recognize that it is our duty to follow the dictates of our higher nature, to be noble and kind and good. It is, therefore, to say the least of it, improbable that we have a higher ideal in our minds than is realized in the All-Supreme. We should, if such a thing were conceivable, be higher than God. Browning says:

"A loving worm within its clod
Is diviner than a loveless God."

In believing, therefore, that God is like the highest ideal our minds can form we are simply asserting that God is greater than we are. In arriving at the conclusion that God is good, or put-

ting it in the glorious words of St. John, that God is love, we reach the highest point in religious thought. We arrive at this conclusion because to think anything else would seem to land us in an absurd position. But we must frankly own that this goodness is not revealed in the world around us. It is a deduction from the nature of the human mind and we must await with patience the next life, when faith will become sight, for the meaning and justification of pain. Faith, then, is the hope that God will turn out to be like the highest we can think of Him.

Now, this brings me to another point on which I must touch lightly, yet without which this lecture would be grievously incomplete. You may say to me, "You have given us plausible reasons for believing in a good God and in the immortality of our own souls, but these beliefs are not peculiar to Christianity. What about miracles and the higher criticism? Can we believe what is told us about the origin of Christianity? What reason is there for regarding Christianity as the only true religion?"

I was brought up to believe that Christianity is true because it is taught in the Bible; that the Bible was God's word given by men who proved that they had the right to speak in God's name by doing miracles. Now, this belief, like many other orthodox beliefs, had a curious history. One large body of Christians held that the true Christian doctrine was conserved and promulgated by the organized body of Christian officers called the Church, presided over by the Bishop of Rome. Amongst the doctrines so promulgated was the infallible character of certain Jewish and early Christian writings called the Scriptures. Luther pointed out that the doctrines contained in the aforesaid Scriptures were often in flat contradiction to the later doctrines promulgated by the Church; he, therefore, rejected the authority of the Church, preferring the Scriptures as giving a truer picture of what Christ taught, though by no means attributing infallibility to them. In particular he called the Epistle of James an epistle of straw. But the desire of the masses to have something infallible to lean on—in a word, to be supplied with ready-made convictions—led the later reformers to oppose an infallible Book to an infallible Church, and thus to place round the neck of religious belief a load from which it is only now beginning to free itself. Our God-given reason imposes on us the duty of taking nothing for granted, and

of seeking for evidence for every statement put before us. We cannot, therefore, deal with the question of the infallibility of the Bible as a whole, because it is not one book, but a collection of sixty-six books of very unequal value. We have no right, that is, to take the noble language of a part of the Gospel to prove the inspiration of the Book of Esther. Each book must stand or fall on its own merits. The scholars called the higher critics* have shown us that there is no reason to believe that the books of the Bible were written in any other way than other books; they show us that these books were compiled from documents of varying degrees of accuracy, and that many of them contain large interpolations by later hands. All admit, however, that the Gospels, especially the first three, give us the earliest recollections of the teachings of Jesus Christ; give us, in a word, a picture of the impression which He made on His first followers.

Now, if we try to cull from this impression what Christ taught and how He lived, we see at once that He taught the highest social virtues which, if followed, would weld all mankind into one family. He further declared, that in teaching these virtues He was declaring the will of God, that He was sent into the world for this purpose; and that whosoever was willing to try to obey His commands would learn for himself that they were the will of God. Now, these are tremendous assertions, and in a scientific age we naturally ask for evidence. But if the human spirit be the truest picture of the All-Supreme which is presented to us, if it be in reality greater than the sun—which, after all, is only a gigantic hot stone—just because the spirit is so much more concrete than the sun; then, if taking Christ at His word and trying His experiment, the results which He predicts will follow, if the soul thus enters on a happy and harmonious development, we have strong grounds for believing Christ did declare the laws of the soul's well-being and was, therefore, the revelation of God. In a word, Christ vindicates His Claims, because, in response to His words, an answering something rises up in our deepest conscious-

*In view of the statements made about the "higher critics" by clergymen and others who have commented on this address, I think it well to remind the reader that the critics are not a pack of wicked infidels, but include almost every Protestant theological professor in Great Britain and Europe, and it is a mere question of time when the same will be true of this Continent also.

ness, and in comparison with this vindication attempted external vindication of those claims seems to me superfluous. Without it, external vindication will never compel the assent of a single disciple.

If the question is raised, whence did Christ get His revelation? Was it not only an amplification of previous insight on the part of the prophets and sages? I think one may safely say that He never got it from the contemplation of external nature. He saw the sparrow fall and yet believed in the goodness of God. As to His predecessors, the most orthodox person believes that He had forerunners; but, let any one apply the simple experimental test—take the writings of any other sage—and see whether they will produce the same results as Christ's sayings have done on millions of souls.

Miracles are, let it be freely confessed, a great stumbling block in the present day. We must remember that however much Christ was the revelation of the Divine, He exhibited that revelation in human form, and not in the human form of a twentieth-century man of culture, but in that of a Jewish peasant of two thousand years ago. By parentage He inherited a language and a stock of common ideas, which had much of mere temporary value. It is impossible to separate between inherited ideas and inherited language—the latter by its very structure is a repository of ideas which are absorbed unconsciously in learning the language. We must make the necessary allowance for this, just as it was necessary to translate His words from Aramaic into Greek and from Greek into English. Further, though doubtless in the Man of Sorrows the Divine Ideal glowed with such brilliance as to press into insignificance all that was temporary, yet we have only received those rays refracted through the turbid minds of His first followers who, by their own confession, did not fully understand their Master. In the age in which they lived, wonderful and magical deeds were supposed to occur quite frequently; and the wonderfulness of Christ's works did not arrest their attention so much as their gracious and loving character. It is quite possible that had we been witnesses of these deeds we should not have termed them miraculous, but have seen in them instances of the wonderful effect of mind on mind in curing nervous diseases—but, of course, this is only a hypothesis.

To this hypothesis one great exception must be made, namely,

the resurrection from the dead. However, we may explain it, the first disciples believed that they saw their Master after His death, and this appearance of Christ was placed by them on an utterly different footing to the appearance of a ghost or "revenant." At that time ghostly appearances would not have excited general incredulity, nor would they have specially encouraged the disciples. But the appearance of Christ as a conqueror, in spite of His apparent defeat, raised them to such a pitch of exaltation that they were transformed from a pitiful band of dejected men into a militant band of glad, joyous warriors for the faith. I am certain that this belief had a cause external to the disciples. The belief in the resurrection produced the Church.

Another exception must be made in the case of the vision of Paul on the road to Damascus, for the account given in Acts is confirmed, not only by the account in one of Paul's admitted letters, but still more by the whole of Paul's theology.

It appears as if he had known little of Christ when He was alive; for he thinks of the Master always as the Son of God in the next world. His adherence to this point of view was so extreme as to lead him to say in one place: "Yea, though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now henceforth know we him no more." It is suspected that it was in opposition to this view that the sayings of Christ were collected from the lips of those who had been His actual companions, and that to this opposition we owe the priceless heritage of the Gospels. For the rest, Paul's theology was Jewish Rabbinism, allegorized and spiritualized it is true, but betraying its origin at every turn. Modern science and modern criticism have destroyed the whole basis of this theology, and for men nowadays it is urgent that if we are to keep our faith we should leave Paul's theology and return to Christ.

One last word. I have spoken of the extreme difficulty of reconciling the soul's apparent beginning in time with its everlasting duration. I venture, in closing, to give a last hint as to how this dualism may eventually be resolved. What if the succession of things in time be itself an illusion and things eternally are, and only appear to succeed one another? If, to use the sublime language of Hegel, "The accomplishment of the Eternal

purpose consists merely in 'removing the illusion which makes it seem as yet unaccomplished'? Or to take Browning:—

"All that is at all
Lasts ever, past recall,
Earth changes, but thy soul and God stand sure.
What entered into thee
That was, is, and shall be.
Time's wheel runs back or stops, Potter and clay endure."

NOTE A.—THE RESURRECTION OF CHRIST.

What we are entitled to conclude from a scientific review of the evidence, is that something happened which made the disciples believe that their Master had conquered death, and which filled them with joy and courage. As to what that something was, opinions will differ. Those to whom belief in miracles causes no difficulty will accept the story as given in the Gospels—that Christ revived from the sleep of death and came out of the tomb. Those who realize what a tremendous amount of minute and careful observation would be required to establish an occurrence contrary to all experience, will incline to the belief that what was vouchsafed to the disciples was a series of telepathic visions of extraordinary brilliancy; since there is a fair amount of evidence that such visions occasionally occur.

NOTE B.—THE VISION OF PAUL.

The reality of the vision of Paul is accepted by Wernle, one of the most advanced critics, in his book "Die Anfänge unserer Religion." As to whether this vision was telepathic, or purely subjective, we have no means of deciding.

NOTE C.—THE TEACHINGS OF PAUL.

The references to this subject are merely meant to assert that Paul's way of looking at things was conditioned by his Rabbinical training, and is totally foreign to the modern point of view. It is not denied that Paul in his day did immense service to Christianity, which he propagated chiefly amongst the liberal Jews of the Dispersion and those philosophic heathen who had already been attracted by the spiritual character of the Jewish conception of God. To such people Rabbinical thought-forms were familiar, and Paul's teaching was admirably adapted for this purpose. The evangelical party at the present day have made frantic attempts to make Christ responsible for Paul's teachings, but even supposing that Paul's vision is placed on the same level as the daily intercourse of the twelve with the Man Jesus Christ (a position which no scientific man would admit for a moment) Paul never asserted that he received more than a brief message from Christ, directing him to seek instructions from the other disciples.